Caveat Emptor: Liability of Buyers for Inducing Violations of Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act by McDowell, Jay H
Boston College Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 2 Article 5
1-1-1964
Caveat Emptor: Liability of Buyers for Inducing
Violations of Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the
Robinson-Patman Act
Jay H. McDowell
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jay H. McDowell, Caveat Emptor: Liability of Buyers for Inducing Violations of Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of
the Robinson-Patman Act, 5 B.C.L. Rev. 261 (1964), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol5/
iss2/5
CAVEAT EMPTOR: LIABILITY OF BUYERS FOR
INDUCING VIOLATIONS OF SECTIONS
2(d) AND 2(e) OF THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT
JAY H. MCDOWELL*
The recent successes enjoyed by the Federal Trade Commission
before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuity and for the District
of Columbia Circuit,' in cases where economically powerful buyers
who had extracted illegal discriminatory promotional allowances from
their suppliers were held to have violated Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act,' strongly indicate that the virtual immunity
enjoyed by buyers who induced violations of Sections 2(d) 4 and 2(e) 5
of the Robinson-Patman Act has come to an end. The Commission's
new approach closes a gap that had developed in the enforcement of
the Robinson-Patman Act.
The only provision of the Robinson-Patman Act aimed solely at
buyers is section 2(0. 6 On its face, this provision applies only to dis-
• LL.B. 1963, University of Virginia Law School; Member of staff of Cadwalader,
Wickersham & Taft, New York City.
1 Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962) ; American News Co. v. FTC,
300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962).
2 Giant Food Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
910 (1963).
3 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1958). This section provides: "Unfair
methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in com-
merce, are declared unlawful."
4 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (Supp. IV, 1959-62) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contract
for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer
of such person in the course of such commerce as compensation or in con-
sideration for any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer
in connection with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any
products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person
unless such payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to
all other customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodi-
ties.
5 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (Supp. IV, 1959-62) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person .to discriminate in favor of one purchaser
against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale,
with or without processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by
contributing to the furnishing of, any services or facilities connected with
the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity so
purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal
terms.
6 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (Supp. IV, 1959-62). This section provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such com-
merce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited
by this section." The Robinson-Patman Act, which was known as the "Chain Store
Act" at the time of its passage in 1936, was enacted primarily to protect the small,
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criminations in price, and does not specifically cover such buyer tactics
as the achievement of competitive advantage by inducing sellers to
grant discriminatory merchandising allowances and services,' unless
the allowances or services amount to discounts or rebates. It appears,
however, that the failure of Congress specifically to include discrimina-
tory merchandising allowances and services in section 2(f) was due to
inadvertence,8
 so that arguably the issue of buyer liability under the
Robinson-Patman Act for inducing violations of sections 2 (d) and 2 (e)
turns upon whether this defect in section 2 (f ) can be cured by construc-
tion.°
In two early cases, the FTC was successful in applying section
2(f) to discriminatory advertising allowances, on the ground that they
were equivalent to price discriminations. 10 In Atlantic City Wholesale
Drug Co.," the respondent published a magazine consisting largely of
advertisements solicited from drug manufacturers. Respondent charged
varying amounts for these advertisements, and accepted payment in
the form of deductions from the purchase price of goods it bought
from the advertisers. Less than 200 copies of the magazine were pub-
lished, and, for the most part, these were distributed to the advertisers
involved. The Commission found injury to competition in the sec-
ondary line and a tendency toward monopoly. The case was actually
tried, but the discrimination consisted of practices which were so
blatant that, once exposed, they could not survive. Similarly, in Miami
Wholesale Drug Corp., 12 the Commission, on the ground that a maga-
zine owned by the respondent was a "subterfuge operated solely . . .
for the purpose of obtaining . . . discriminations in price . . .'" 8 issued
an order barring respondent from
Inducing sellers to discriminate in price between either of
independent merchant against the encroachments of large buyers, who, through the
use of their mass purchasing power, were able to obtain direct and indirect price
concessions from sellers. Congress, however, chose to achieve this goal mainly through
the imposition of a series of restrictions on sellers. See Rowe, Price Discriminations
Under the Robinson-Patman Act 423-24 (1962).
7 See Note, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 291 (1961).
See Dunn, Sections 2(d) and 2(e), CCH Robinson-Patman Act Symposium 55,
61 (1946).
9
 It has been suggested that so to construe § 2(f) would require, in effect, reading
out the words "in price" from the section. Austin, Price Discrimination and Related
Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act 165 (2d rev. ed. 1959). See also Steele &
Coughlin, Buyer Responsibility Before the Federal Trade Commission, 2 B.C. Ind &
Com. L. Rev. 257 (1961).
19
 Atlantic City Wholesale Drug Co., 38 F.T.C. 631 (1944); Miami Wholesale
Drug Corp., 28 F.T.C. 485 (1939); cf. National Tea Co., 46 F.T.C. 829 (1950),
modified, 47 F.T.C. 1314 (1951) (buyer reimbursed for cash coupons distributed to
customers redeemable in seller's merchandise).
ll Supra note 10.
12 Supra note 10.
13 Miami Wholesale Drug Corp., supra note 10, at 487
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the said parties respondent and other purchasers of com-
modities of like grade and quality, by granting, allowing, and
paying to either of the said parties respondent herein, in con-
nection with the purchases of either of said parties respond-
ent, any advertising allowances, or anything of value in lieu
thereof, which are not granted by such sellers to all of their
customers on proportionately equal terms."
In effect, the FTC's order treated discriminatory advertising allow-
ances as equivalent to discrimination in price."
In addition to the above cases, section 2(f) has been applied to
a variety of discriminatory arrangements involving trade and quantity
discounts and variations in the terms of sale." Moreover, despite Sec-
tion 4 of the Robinson-Patman Act" which permits a co-operative
association to distribute to its members savings achieved through co-
operative buying, the Commission has been successful recently in us-
ing section 2(f) against automotive parts co-operative buying associa-
tions, on the ground that these buying setups are really no more than
bookkeeping devices without functional utility."
An examination of the section 2(f) cases to date indicates that
its scope has never been determined either judicially or by the FTC.
It has been suggested that section 2(f) covers all violations of section
2." In 1955, the Attorney General's Committee took the position that:
14 Id. at 491-92.
15 See Rowe, op. cit. supra note 6, at 430. The courts have also entertained
private damage suits under § 2(f) against buyers who received discriminatory merchan-
dising allowances and services, on the theory that excessive advertising allowances were
equivalent to price discrimination. American Co-op. Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co.,
153 F.2d 907, 913 (7th Cir. 1946) ; Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 142 F.
Supp. 230, 237 (D.N.J. 1956). See also Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737,
739, 744 (7th Cir. 1952) (§ 2(f) suit based on receipt of discriminatory "services and
facilities").
19 See, e.g., Shell Oil Co., 54 F.T.C. 1274 (1958) (purchases of gasoline by cab
companies at lower prices than standard retailer prices for resale to public); Curtiss
Candy Co., 44 F.T.C. 237 (1947) (manipulation of price guarantees) ; Associated
Merchandising Corp., 40 F.T.C. 578 (1945) (cumulative annual rebates to buying as-
sociation based on its members' combined purchases) ; A.S. Aloe Co., 34 F.T.C. 363 (1941)
(special price discounts to preferred buyers) ; Golf Ball Mfrs'. Ass'n, 26 F.T.C. 824
(1938) (special discounts for a professional golfer's association in return for the privilege
of stamping their name on golf balls) ; Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 25 F.T.C. 1228 (1937)
(quantity discounts to members of trade association) ; Bird & Son, Inc., 25 F.T.C. 548
(1937) (mail order house price discounts).
17 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 136 (1958).
19 American Motor Specialties Co. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 884 (1960) ; accord, Mid-South Distributors v. FTC, 287 F.2d 512 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 838 (1961). For a thorough discussion of these cases, see
Steele & Coughlin, Buyer Resonsibility Before the Federal Trade Commission, 2 B.C.
Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 257, 263-68 (1961).
19 See, e.g., Rowe, op. cit. supra note 6, at 428-29, 432-33; Att'y Gen. Nat'l
Antitrust Comm. Rep. 197 (1955).
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Doubtless many complexities will attend full development of
the buyer's liability, since section 2(f) in effect enacts a de-
rivative liability subject to every interpretive vagary of
each subsection defining discriminatory practices forbidden
to sellers."
Other writers, however, take the position that section 2(f) relates only
to price discriminations forbidden by Section 2(a) of the Robinson-
Patman Act" and that it includes inducement of 2(d) and 2(e) viola-
tions only if they also constitute indirect price discriminations in viola-
tion of 2(a)."
It has been suggested that the above divergence of opinion may be
partially explained by inconsistent Supreme Court dicta.' In FTC v.
Simplicity Pattern Co.,' the Court, commenting that sections 2(c),
2(d) and 2(e) make certain business practices other than price dis-
criminations unqualifiedly unlawful, added in a footnote that:
Subsection (f) is a corollary to § 2(a), making it unlawful
"knowingly to induce or recieve" a price discrimination bar-
red by the latter. See Automatic Canteen Co. v. Federal
Trade Comm'n. .
A few years earlier, however, in Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC,' a
section 2(f) case, the Court, after stating that 2(f) should be read as
"making it unlawful only to induce or receive prices known to be pro-
hibited discriminations,"" added in a footnote that:
We of course do not, in so reading § 2(f), purport to pass
on the question whether a "discrimination in price" includes
the prohibitions in such other sections of the Act as §§ 2(d)
and 2(e). 28
20 Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 197 (1955).
21 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. 6 13(a) (Supp. IV, 1959-62). This section provides
in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce . . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality, . . . where the effect of such dis-
crimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them. . . .
22 See e.g., Austin, op. cit. supra note 9, at 164-66; Stedman, Twenty-Four Years
of the Robinson-Patman Act, 1960 Wis. L. Rev. 197, 215; cf. Edwards, The Price
Discrimination Law 486-87 (1959).
23 See Note, 13 Stan. L. Rev. 657, 658 n.3 (1961). Compare FTC v. Simplicity
Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 65 n.6 (1959) (dictum), with Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC,
346 U.S. 61, 73 n.14 (1953) (dictum).
24 360 U.S. 55 (1959).
25 Id. at 65 n.6.
26 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
27 Id. at 73.
28 Id. at 73 n.14.
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While the above quoted dicta can scarcely be argued as determina-
tive of the issue under discussion, it should be noted that the dictum
from the Automatic Canteen case by implication permits the Com-
mission's original approach to section 2(f) as illustrated by the Atlantic
City Wholesale Drug Corp. and Miami Wholesale Drug Corp. deci-
sions of the Commission."
Under both of the above approaches, if section 2(f) governs the
transaction, the FTC must, under the rules announced by the Supreme
Cotirt in the Automatic Canteen case not only show a violation of
sections 2(d) and 2(e) from the seller's viewpoint, but also must
further show that the buyer knew or had reason to know that the
merchandising allowances or services it was receiving were illegal."
The Automatic Canteen Company is a large buyer of candy and other
products for resale through automatic vending machines located in at
least thirty-three states. In the proceedings before the Commission, the
FTC's attorneys introduced evidence that the company received, and
sometimes solicited, from 80 of 133 of its suppliers prices that it knew
to be as much as thirty-three per cent lower than prices quoted to
other purchasers. The FTC's attorneys did not attempt to show that
the company knew that the price differentials were not cost justified,
on the theory that when a buyer knowingly receives a price concession
of sufficient size to cause "injurious" discrimination, a prima facie
violation of section 2(f) is established." This approach, which essen-
tially equates a prima facie case against a buyer under section 2(f)
with a prima fade case against a seller under section 2(a), 82 was af-
firmed by the Court of Appeals."
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the FTC's construction of
section 2(f), on the ground that it ignored that section's requirement
of knowing inducement or receipt of an illegal price concession. Under
the Supreme Court's holding, the FTC has not made out a prima facie
2(f) violation until it has shown that a reasonable buyer would have
known that the price concessions were unjustified." The Court's con-
cept of a prima facie 2(f) case, based on grounds of "fairness" and
29 See text accompanying notes 11-14, supra.
30 Rowe, op. cit. supra note 6, at 430.
81 Automatic Canteen Co., 46 F.T.C. 861, 896 (1950). The company took the
position before the FTC that the Commission's attorneys had to prove that the dis-
criminations were not only injurious but also illegal in order to make out a violation
of 2(f), and that, therefore, the Commission had the burden of showing that the
price concessions were not cost justified. The Commission's attorneys, relying upon the
holding in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948), that a seller discriminating
in price has the burden of showing cost justification, reasoned that the same burden
should be on a buyer who induced a violation.
32 See Rowe, op. cit. supra note 6, at 439; see generally, id. at 438-42.
33 Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 194 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1952).
84 See e.g., Handler, Recent Anti-Trust Devolpments, 71 Yale L.J. 75 (1961); Note,
53 Colum. L. Rev. 1009 (1953).
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"convenience", placed on the FTC the burden of going forward with
evidence to make out all the elements of such a violation." On the bur-
den of proof issue, however, the Court expressly declined to decide
that section 2 (b) 88
 applies to 2(f). Rather, the Court stated that if it
did, it could be invoked only after the FTC showed that a reasonable
buyer would have suspected that the price concession was unjustified."
The Automatic Canteen case can reasonably be read to require
that the FTC show only approximate knowledge by the buyer of the
illegality of a price concession. The first FTC interpretations of the
decision, however, took the position that the burden of proof placed
on the Commission was so onerous as to put an end, virtually, to the
usefulness of the section under most circumstances." This position was
supported by several writers."
Since 1957, the FTC has sought to reanimate section 2(f) en-
forcement by evolving new methods of proof which are compatible
with Automatic Canteen, yet which are feasible in practice." The Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals in American Motor Specialties v. FTC,"
approved the Commission's reassessment of Automatic Canteen:
Automatic Canteen held that, despite the provisions of Sec-
tion 2 (b), the Commission did not establish, prima facie, a
violation of Section 2(f) merely by introducing evidence that
the buyer had received prices lower than its competitors,
35 Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, supra note 26, at 81 (dictum).
80 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (Supp. IV, 1959-62). This section pro-
vides:
Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that
there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the
burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification
shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section, and unless
justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to
issue an order terminating the discrimination: Provided, however, That nothing
herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made
by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to
any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low
price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor.
ST Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, supra note 26, at 65; see Note, 53 Colum. L.
Rev. 1009, 1010 (1953).
88 See Borden-Aicklen Auto Supply Co., 50 F.T.C. 952, 953 (1954), to the
effect that the FTC's attorneys were required to
assume the burden of showing that the discriminatory prices allegedly knowingly
induced and received by the respondents were not within one of the sellers'
defenses and that respondents knew or should have known that the lower
prices were not within one of those defenses.
80 See, e.g., Austin, op. cit. supra note 9, at 148; Edwards, op. cit. supra note 22, at
513-14.
40 See text accompanying notes 16-17, supra; see generally, Rowe, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 442-46.
41 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1960). This decision is the
FTC's first § 2(f) victory before the reviewing courts.
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but that the Commission must also come forward with some
evidence that the buyer knew that the prices it was receiving
violated Section 2(a). [Italics in original.] 42
Although the court in American Motor Specialties did not delineate
what would be required to rebut the new minimum section 2(f) prima
facie case, the buyer presumably would be exonerated if he could show
either that the challenged price concession was not in fact illegal, or,
alternatively, that he had no knowledge of its illegality."
Although successful against buyers for inducing and receiving a
section 2(a) price discrimination, the Commission has not attempted
to use 2(f) against buyers who induce violations of sections 2(d) and
2(e). Rather, in Grand Union Co. v. FTC," the Commission utilized
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act" against receipt by a
buyer of discriminatory advertising allowances illegal under section
2(d). The Commission took the position that although not specifically
prohibited by any provision of Section 2 of the Robinson-Patren
Act, a knowing inducement of a violation of section 2(d)" violated
the policy underlying that statute, and thereby constituted an unfair
trade practice in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act. The facts of the case were that in 1952 the Grand Union Com-
pany, a supermarket chain, organized a sign promotion program con-
sisting of a "combined electric spectacular and animated cartoon dis-
play" located in Times Square in New York City. The sign was ar-
ranged by an advertising agency, and Grand Union, as its part of the
bargain, secured advertisers for the program, most of whom were
suppliers who distributed their products through Grand Union's stores.
At first, Grand Union received advertising space on the sign for its
services which it could exchange for radio and television advertising.
Later, however, the terms of the contract were modified, and Grand
Union received money payments. To sell space on the sign, Grand
42 Id. at 228.
n See Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 68, 70-71 (1953) (dictum).
44 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962); accord, American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962). The complaint in the Grand Union case
appears to have been drawn on the theory that buyer liability under § 2(f) applies
only to direct or indirect price discriminations under § 2(a), and, therefore, does not
cover violations of §§ 2(d) and 2(e). See Grand Union Co., FTC Dkt. No. 6973 (1960).
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)
(1958), was used to bridge, in effect, the gap in jurisdiction the FTC has evidently
concluded exists in § 2(f). See generally Steele & Coughlin, Buyer Responsjbility
Before the Federal Trade Commission, 2 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 257 (1961).
45 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958).
46 The Second Circuit, in another case, held that one of the participating ad-
vertisers in Grand Union's promotional program had violated § 2(d). Swanee Paper
Corp. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1961).
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Union gave a number of its suppliers specific assurances of promotional
services for their products in Grand Union stores.
On appeal, the Second Circuit pointed out that, although the FTC
conceded that Grand Union's practices were not specifically prohibited
by the Robinson-Patman Act, the Commission had rejected Grand
Union's argument that since Congress specifically prohibited concept-
ually related practices under section 2 (f), its silence on inducements of
section 2 (d) violations implied Congressional assent to such practices.
The Commission based its position on the ground that the omission of
2(d) offenses from section 2 (f) resulted from legislative oversight, and
that Congress did not intend to countenance practices that clearly vio-
late the "spirit" of the Robinson-Patman Act. The Commission decided
that it was duty-bound to "supplement and bolster" the policy behind
the Act."
The court, in a 2 to I decision, agreed with the Commission's ap-
proach, stating:
Grand Union's activities are inconsistent with the purpose
of § 2 (d) of the Clayton Act, and one need not resort to
metaphysical subtleties to denominate its conduct an unfair
method of competition. . . . The Commission has found that
Grand Union knowingly received the payments even though
equivalent allowances were not made available to other re-
tail grocers, large or small. Thus, by benefit of its size, Grand
Union was able to secure competitive benefits ... which Con-
gress declared contrary to public policy.... Using the policies
of § 2(d) as a yardstick, the Commission has declared Grand
Union's conduct "unfair." The plain meaning of the word
would seem to support this conclusion. . . . We see no reason
to upset the Commission's determination. [Citations omit-
ted.'"
The court then went on to approve the FTC's per se application of
section 2 (d) to Grand Union Company, which relieved the Commission
of the burden of proving a substantial injury to competition, on the
ground that
In making some, but not all, of the practices outlawed by
the Robinson-Patman Act illegal per se, Congress indicated
47 Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92, 95 (2d Cir. 1962). The court also
stated at 95:
We need not determine whether the payments made by the participating ad-
vertisers to or for the benefit of Grand Union are "a discrimination in
price" within the meaning of 2(f). The question whether or not that
section outlaws activity such as petitioner's was left open in Automatic Can-
teen Co. of America v. United States. . . . This issue was not raised in the
proceedings below.
48 Id. at 99.
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that those selected for per se treatment always led to the un-
desired effects on competition. 4 °
Although the FTC's approach in Grand Union to buyer induce-
ment of section 2 (d) offenses was admittedly, Inovel, the Commission
was on reasonably firm ground in utilizing Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act to proceed against "equivalent" types of prac-
tices which are just outside the jurisdiction of the Clayton Act." The
Attorney General's Committee took the position that the FTC may
legitimately challenge under section 5 conduct which is economically
equivalent to the anti-competitive practices forbidden by the Clayton
Act, but which may not be reached thereunder due to the lack of tech-
nical prerequisites," with the caveat that section 5 should not be used
as a substitute for the Clayton Act to attack a transaction which is
covered by the latter. A few years earlier, Mr. Justice Douglas stated
for the majority in FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co.,"
that:
It is also clear that the Federal Trade Commission Act was
designed to supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act ... to stop in their incipiency acts and practices
which, when full blown, would violate those Acts . . . as well
as to condemn as "unfair methods of competition" existing
violations of them. [Emphasis supplied.] 53
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act authorizes the
FTC to issue cease and desist orders when and if it finds that the
methods of competition complained of are unfair, that the methods
of competition are in commerce and that the order appears to be in the
best interest of the public. Although the courts have given the Com-
mission wide discretion in defining "unfair methods of competition,"
they have retained for themselves the final decision as to whether sec-
tion 5 has been violated." The Federal Trade Commission Act does
not define the phrase "unfair methods of competition" nor does it
establish standards to govern its interpretation. 55
4° Ibid.
BO See Oppenheim, Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act with the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 821, 835 (1961):
While alternative constructions may be gleaned from Congressional legislative
history, it seems that, on balance, the Commission has authority under section
5 to proceed against equivalent types of practices not within the jurisdictional
bounds of the coverage specified in the Clayton Act.
51 Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 148-49 (1955); accord, Foremost
Dairies, Inc., 52 F.T.C. 1480 (1956).
52 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
. 	 53 Id. at 394-95.
54 FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920); see generally, Note, 12 Syracuse L. Rev.
246 (1961) ; Note, 8 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 243 (1961).
55 The Senate Report which accompanied the Federal Trade Commission Act at
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The facts in Grand Union appear to make out a sufficiently strong
case for the application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. The FTC's decision, however, was greeted with disapproval as
representing an unwarranted extension of Robinson-Patman Act juris-
diction, with possible undesirable effects on the wider policies of the
antitrust laws which are to foster competition." This disapproval will,
no doubt, be increased by the Second Circuit's affirmance of the Com-
mission's decision."
The major objection to the Commission's Grand Union decision
appears to be that the application of section 5 to the per se liability of
section 2(d), and, perhaps, sections 2 (c) and 2 (e), will create a "rov-
ing jurisdiction," impossible to "canalize" which will "overflow" into
the area covered by the Clayton Act," with the result that the Com-
mission will in effect be in a position to rewrite the antitrust laws. This
objection also underlies Judge Moore's dissents in Grand Union and
American News, and was expressed by him a few years earlier in
Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC:"
the time of its passage sheds some light on the absence of a definition of the phrase
"unfair methods of competition." The report of the Committee on Interstate Commerce
explained that:
The Committee gave careful consideration to the question as to whether it
would attempt to define the many and variable unfair practices which prevail
in commerce and to forbid their continuance or whether it would leave it to
the Commission to determine what practices were unfair. It concluded that
the latter course would be the better. .
S. Rep. No. 59, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914). As Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act has been interpreted by the Supreme Court, whether a particular trade
practice is an unfair method of competition is ultimately for the courts, and not for
the Commission, to determine. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920). The Court
evidently considers section 5 as "a flexible concept with evolving content," FTC v.
Bunte Bros. Inc., 312 U. S. 349, 353 (1941), which is sufficiently broad to permit the
Commission to move against practices which run "counter to the public policy declared
in the Sherman and Clayton Acts," Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457,
463 (1941).
68 See, e.g., Alexander, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, A Deus ex
Machina in the Tragic Interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act, 12 Syracuse L. Rev.
317 (1961); Handler, Recent Anti-Trust Developments, 71 Yale L.J. 75 (1961); Oppen-
beim, Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act with the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 821 (1961); Rahl, Does Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act Extend the Clayton Act?, 5 Anti-Trust Bull. 533 (1960);
Note, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 291 (1961); Note, 49 Geo. L.J. 379 (1960) ; Note, 13 Stan.
L. Rev. 657 (1961); Note, 12 Syracuse L. Rev. 657 (1961); Not; 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rev.
243 (1961).
57 See Rowe, op. cit. supra note 6, at 435, suggesting that as both Grand Union
and American News were 2 to 1 decisions, Judge Moore dissenting at length on the
section 5 issue, the section 5 controversy is ripe for consideration by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court, however, has denied certiorari in the American News case. American
News Co. v. FTC, 371 U.S. 824 (1962).
58 See Oppenheim, Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act with the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 821, 826 (1961).
58 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958).
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The expertise possessed by an administrative agency, how-
. ever, does not empower it to rewrite the laws which it has
been charged with enforcing. This is the function of Con-
gress."
Concurrently with the Grand Union case, the FTC employed se-
tion 5 against the "knowing receipt" of a variety of merchandising al-
lowances which in effect gave the buyers favored treatment from their
suppliers."
The Commission's victories in Grand Union and American News
were crowned by another success in Giant Food Inc. v. FTC,62 this time
before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Giant Food
operates a chain of supermarkets. In 1954, 1955 and 1956, Giant spon-
sored "Anniversary" and "Candy Carnival" sales, in connection with
which it sent to its suppliers "contracts of participation." These con-
tracts were an arrangement whereby each participating supplier would
pay a specific sum of money to Giant, in return for which Giant agreed
to promote the participating supplier's products throughout the period
alloted for the sale. The Commission held that Giant had violated
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and issued a cease
and desist order. On appeal, Giant argued that Section 2(d) of the
Robinson-Patman Act made it unlawful only for sellers to make dis-
criminatory payments, thus reading section 2(d) in connection with
2(f). Giant interpreted 2(f) as applying only to price discrimination,
and concluded that the Commission was powerless to proceed against
it under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The court
did not agree, basing its decision on the view that "the Commission is
merely declaring to be an unfair method of competition a practice
which is plainly contrary to,the policy of the Clayton Act as amended
by the Robinson-Patman Act.""3 The court, however, did hold that the
Commission's order, which banned "inducement" of discriminatory
promotional allowances, was too broad. The court advised the Com-
mission that:
Specifically, the order should be directed toward the prohibi-
tion of a knowing inducement and receipt of, receipt of, or
contracting for the receipt of discriminatory display and pro-
motional allowances. [Italics in original.] 64
60 Id. at 374. See also statement of Mr. Justice Black in FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,
334 U. S. 37, 48 (1948): "Since Congress has not seen fit to give carload discounts any
favored classification, we cannot do so."
61 See, e.g., Food Fair Stores, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 392 (1957) (dismissed on other
grounds); United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp., 53 F.T.C. 102 (1956); ATD Catalogues,
Inc., FTC. Dkt. No. 8100 (Aug. 25, 1960) (complaint); Benner Tea Co., FTC Dkt.
No. 7866 (April 19, 1960) (complaint).
62 307 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 910 (1963).
63 Id. at 186.
64 Id. at 187.
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The Second Circuit's Grand Union and American News decisions,
followed by the District of Columbia Circuit's Giant Food decisidn,
give the FTC a potent and flexible weapon to use against buyers who
induce violations of section 2 (d), and, very likely, section 2 (e). The
courts in these cases did not, however, go very deeply into the defenses
available to a buyer to rebut the Commission's new section 5 prima
facie case, except that the court in Grand Union did state that the Com-
mission was correct in limiting the complaint to "knowing receipt or
inducement" of disproportionate allowances," citing Automatic Can-
teen as analogous. This position was seemingly accepted by the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in Giant Food. Since the final definition of
what constitutes an unfair trade practice rests with the courts, knowl-
edge may fairly be said to be an element of a Grand Union type offense.
It would seem to be possible to question the applicability of the
Automatic Canteen doctrine to the Commission's Grand Union prima
facie case, on the ground that in Grand Union the buyer's liability does
not rest on section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act, which, under the
Automatic Canteen doctrine, requires "knowing" inducement or receipt
to complete a violation. In Grand Union, the buyer's liability rested on
the Commission's finding under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act that inducement and receipt of non-proportional advertis-
ing allowances was an "unfair trade practice." Thus, although the FTC
framed its Grand Union complaint in the language of Section 2(f) of
the Robinson-Patman Act, claiming that Grand Union knowingly in-
duced or received illegal payments, the narrow question decided by the
Second Circuit was:
Does § 5 extend to petitioner's activity which, while an in-
tegral part of a transaction outlawed by § 2 (d) of the Clay-
ton Act, nevertheless is not expressly proscribed by that stat-
ute or indeed by any other antitrust statute?"
The Second Circuit further pointed out that " [n] either party . . .
[discussed] the possibility that § 2(f) might be held to apply
here."" The Second Circuit based its approval of the "knowledge"
requirement essentially on grounds of fairness, stating that:
It would be a harsh burden to hold that any buyer who in-
duces or receives a payment later found to be disproportion-
ate has engaged thereby in unfair competition. The Com-
mission in this case has correctly limited the complaint to
"knowing receipt or inducement" of disproportionate pay-
ments.. . .68
66 Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1962) (dictum).
88 id. at 96 (dictum).
67 Id. at 95.
t8 Id. at 100.
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As the Second Circuit viewed the Commission's prima facie case in
Grand Union, therefore, "knowing receipt or inducement"" was an
element of the section 5 unfair trade practice.
The analogy to Automatic Canteen, however, appears to be very
strong. Part of the rationale behind the FTC's use of section 5 against
the Grand Union Company was that Congress, apparently due to legis-
lative oversight, did not include inducement of 2 ( d ) violations within
the ambit of section 2 (f), making the use of section 5 necessary to cure
what amounted to a technical jurisdictional flaw. It would seem, there-
fore, that so far as applicable, the prima facie 2 (f) case set out by
the Supreme Court in Automatic Canteen would apply whenever the
Commission uses section 5 against a buyer for inducing a 2(d) viola-
tion." It is reasonable to conclude, on the basis of the above, that lack
of knowledge on the part of the buyer that the 2 (d) allowances it re-
ceived were disproportionate is a valid defense to a Grand Union type
complaint.
The defense of meeting competition in good faith provided by
Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act appears to be available to
a buyer in a Grand Union type proceeding. The Supreme Court in FTC
v. Simplicity Pattern Co." construed section 2 (e) as an "absolute ban"
on discriminatory promotional services which did not require proof of
competitive injury, with the result that the usual section 2 (a) defenses
such as absence of competitive injury or the existence of cost justifica-
tion do not apply. The Court concluded that "the only escape Congress
has provided for discriminations in services or facilities is the permis-
sion to meet competition as found in the 2 (b) proviso." 72 Regarding
section 2(d), the FTC took the position after the Simplicity Pattern
case that the 2 (b) meeting competition proviso did not apply to 2(d)
violations." This position, however, was rejected by the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia in Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v.
62 Ibid. The Court, however, reserved opinion on whether:
inducement might be read as not requiring receipt, and hence a buyer could
violate § 5 even though the seller did not violate § 2(d). Thus § 5 might be read
to apply to the buyer's attempts to have the seller violate § 2(d). We need not
decide this question, as receipt was shown here.
Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92, 96 n.4 (2d Cir. 1962) (dictum).
7° Perhaps one might say that when the "spirit" of the Clayton Act, which is said
to haunt the antitrust laws as a result of the Grand Union case, emerges "wraithlike
when the Commission utters the incantation 'section 5' ", the "spirit" of Automatic
Canteen's prima fade § 2(f) case also emerges to protect the erring buyer, See Grand
Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
71 Supra note 24.
72 Id. at 67.
73 See FTC Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments
and Services, Trade Reg. Rep. if 14, at 6072, 6076 (1960); Henry Rosenfeld, Inc., 52
F.T.C. 1535, 1540, 1541 (1956).
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FTC," with the result that good faith meeting of competition is now
available in 2 (d) cases.
Since the FTC's Grand Union type case depends upon the induce-
ment or receipt of an illegal merchandising allowance, the section 2 (b)
proviso would appear to be available to permit the buyer to show that
the merchandising allowance it induced and received was given by the
seller for the purpose of "meeting competition" to retain the buyer's
trade in an individual competitive situation and therefore was not il-
legal. It would seem, however, that the buyer could not use as a defense
the fact that the seller gave the disproportionate allowance for the pur-
pose of obtaining the buyer's trade, under the FTC's current approach
to the meeting competition proviso."
For the aggressive buyer, the 2(b) meeting competition proviso
may prove to be almost a complete defense. A buyer who informs one
seller of the price offers of another, and who as a result obtains a dis-
proportionate merchandising allowance will probably have gone far to
protect himself against a Grand Union type charge in the process of
bargaining for the concession. Such a buyer has supplied the seller with
knowledge of competitive offers, thus laying• the ground work for a
claim that the seller was merely meeting lawful competitive offers in
good faith by granting the disproportionate allowance." The difficulties
of proof that such a maneuver would pose for the Commission are ob-
vious. The Commission's problems in this regard, of course, are to
some extent a result of the fact that no advertising allowance is illegal
when initially granted by the seller. It is the seller's failure to make
the allowance available on substantially proportionate terms to other
buyers that completes the offense.
Following its successes in Grand Union, American News, and
Giant Food, the Commission apparently has devoted its energies to
defining the new violation and considering the factual criteria necessary
to make out a prima facie case. Buyers are now charged with
violating Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
by knowingly inducing and receiving payments from suppliers
for services and facilities in connection with respondents'
offering for sale or sale of goods not available to all of their
competitors on proportionally equal terms."
In another decision, the Commission stated that the following
four basic factual elements are necessary to prove that Section 5 of the
74 301 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888 (1962); see Note,
48 Va. L. Rev. 574 (1962).
76 See Rowe, op. cit. supra note 6, at 420.
76 Cf. Edwards, op. cit. supra note 22, at 513-14.
77 Foster Publishing Co., FTC Dkt. No. 7698, Trade Reg. Rep. 1f 16,015, at 20,846
(July 26, 1962).
274
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: BUYER LIABILITY
Federal Trade Commission Act has been violated by the knowing in-
ducement and receipt of a discriminatory promotional allowance:
1. The solicitation and receipt by respondent in commerce
of payments for promotional services in connection with the
resale of a supplier's product.
2. That at approximately the time of the solicitation and
receipt, other customers of the supplier were competing with
the recipient in the distribution of the grantor-supplier's
goods of like grade and quality.
3. The payments received by respondents were not affirma-
tively offered by the suppliers to such competing customers
on proportionally equal terms.
4. That respondent possessed information sufficient to put
upon it the duty of making inquiry to ascertain whether the
granting suppliers were making such payments available to
its competitors on proportionally equal terms."
Regarding the first of the four criteria, the Commission in an
earlier case held that section 5 is violated if a buyer solicits and re-
ceives outright gifts or donations." In this case a large department
store solicited contributions from some 780 of its 20,000 suppliers in
connection with a sales promotion campaign centering around its 100th
Anniversary. In each instance the contribution sought was $1000, and
some $540,000 was ultimately collected. The Commission took a dual
approach, first finding a violation of section 5 on what may be described
as "traditional" grounds, and next supplying an alternative basis for
its decision on the grounds of Grand Union and American News.
The above cases are, of course, too few to provide a reliable in-
sight into what the boundaries of the new violation of section 5 and the
defenses available against it will eventually prove to be. It is reasonably
clear that the offense consists of two elements. First, the seller's failure
to make promotional allowances available to all competing customers
on proportionally equal terms. Secondly, knowing solicitation and
78 J. Weingarten, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 7714, Trade Reg. Rep. g 16,349, at 21,183
(March 25, 1963).
29 R. H. Macy & Co., FTC Dkt. No. 7869, Trade Reg. Rep. lf 15,895 (May 15, 1962).
The Commission stated at 20,710:
We are also of the view that the same general principle which governed the
Grand Union and American News cases should apply here. The mere circum-
stance that in this case there is no showing that any service or facility was
furnished by the respondent for the contributions solicited and received is not
a significant difference. The inequity in the use of size to obtain special concessions
is the same in either case. If it is contrary to public policy for a large buyer
by reason of its size to secure disproportionate advertising allowances, clearly
public policy is contravened in the exercise of economic might to obtain out-
right gifts or donations.
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receipt by an economically powerful buyer of allowances not made
available to all competing customers on proportionally equal terms.
Moreover, the Commission's insistence on detailed findings of fact
with meticulous attention to minute details should reassure those who
feared that the new Grand Union type violation of the antitrust laws
would prove impossible to keep within reasonable bounds. Thus far the
Commission's approach may be characterized as one of "cautious
reasonableness," in which the Commission has attempted to consolidate
its victories in Grand Union, American News and Giant Food.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Under the existing case law, the Commission appears to have
available two and possibly three methods to attack inducement by
buyers of violations of Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman
Act. The first method would be to charge the buyer under section 2(f)
with knowing inducement and receipt of an indirect price discrimina-
tion violative of section 2(a). The American Motor Specialties" and
Mid-South Distributors' cases, the Commission's first 2(f) victories
before the reviewing courts, indicate that the Supreme Court did not
place an impossible burden on the Commission in Automatic Can-
teen, 82 and that it is possible to establish a 2(f) case against a buyer
in a reasonably straight-forward manner. To proceed against inducing
violations of sections 2(d) and 2(e) would appear merely to add
another comparatively simple element to the American Motor Special-
ties type of 2(f) proceeding: that of adducing some evidence to show
that the disproportionate allowance amounted to an indirect price
discrimination.
The major difficulty with this type proceeding, so far as the Com-
mission is concerned, is that it makes available to the defendant buyer,
and places upon the Commission the burden of meeting, all the de-
fenses to a section 2(a) action, besides the added 2(f) requirement
of "knowing" inducement and receipt. This consideration alone would
probably be sufficient to interest the Commission, to the end of main-
taining a good enforcement record, in devising a simpler approach to
attack inducement of 2(d) and 2(e) violations.
The second method of attack now available to the Commission
was established by its victory in Grand Union. 83 The prima facie case
in this type proceeding, as outlined by the Second Circuit, appears to
89 American Motors Specialties Co. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 884 (1960).
81 Mid-South Distributers v. FTC, 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
838 (1961).
82 Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
83 Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
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be considerably simpler than the American Motor Specialties type
2(f) proceeding. Moreover, the defenses of cost justification and ab-
sence of injury to competition, which would be available to the buyer
under the American Motor Specialties approach, do not appear avail-
able to the buyer in the Grand Union type case. As indicated above,
however, the defense of good faith meeting of competition will be
available, and the careful buyer should be able to make good use of it.
The third possible approach is that, suggested by the early section
2(f) cases and the Attorney General's Committee, of considering 2(f)
as establishing a form of derivative liability, applicable directly to
sections 2 (d) and 2(e). The legality of this approach was left open
in Automatic Canteen, and the Second Circuit in Grand Union again
commented on its availability. 84 The Commission, however, has taken
the position that
Under section 2(a) it is unlawful to discriminate in prices
between customers under certain circumstances where the
effect may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly; and under section 2 (f) it is unlawful
knowingly to induce and receive such a discrimination."
In view of the Commission's success in the Grand Union, American
News" and Giant Foods"' cases, it is unlikely that the Commission will
consider adopting the derivative liability theory. Moreover, since the
Supreme Court has denied certiorari in the American News and Giant
Food cases, the FTC has added authority, in a negative sense, to con-
tinue to use its Grand Union approach.
A derivative liability theory, however, would appear to be more
in keeping with the general scheme of enforcement of the antitrust
laws, since it would avoid the danger inherent in the Grand Union
type approach that Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
will overlap into, or even obliterate, the other provisions of the Clayton
Act in less extreme cases than Grand Union. The initial problem with
the derivative theory, of course, is that it has never been judicially
tested and approved, the question merely being regarded as open.
In view of its signal success in the Grand Union case, this is a problem
the Federal Trade Commission will undoubtedly have little interest
in attempting to solve.
84 Id. at 95.
85 1961 FTC Ann. Rep. 37.
86 American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
824 (1962).
87 Giant Food Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
910 (1963).
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